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This paper investigates the impact of unemployment on crime using a country-level panel data 
set from Europe that contains consistently-measured crime and police force statistics. 
Unemployment has a positive impact on monetary crimes, and instrumenting unemployment 
with the exchange rate produces larger estimates than those obtained from OLS specifications. 
The unemployment rate is decomposed into various components such as gender-specific and 
education-specific unemployment. The analysis of specific population sub-groups’ 
unemployment reveals that about 65% of the overall impact of unemployment on crime is 
attributable to the unemployment of males with low education. 
 
                                                             
* I thank Naci Mocan and Julie Cullen for valuable comments and suggestions. 1 
 
1. Introduction 
In recent years there have been large increases in crime in Europe. For example, between 
1975 and 2000, crime has risen by 97% in France, 145% in U.K., and a staggering 410% in 
Spain. Consequently, it has become a major concern among Europeans. According to a 2005 
European Commission report, at least 35% of the population in 12 European Union member 
countries
2 feels unsafe on the streets after dark because of the prevalence of crime. In 13 member 
countries
3, at least 50% of the population has installed anti-theft devices against burglaries or 
thefts (The Burden of Crime in Europe, 2005). As a result, crime reduction has been placed to 
the top of the central policy issues by some of Europe's prominent politicians
4
The economics literature has suggested that criminal activity is primarily motivated by 
net relative benefits to illegal activities. First pointed out by Becker (1968), potential criminals 
weigh the costs and benefits of committing crime. Crime and labor markets are not mutually 
exclusive choices but they represent a continuum of legal and illegal income-generating 
competing activities (Mocan, Billups and Overland 2005, Machin and Meghir 2004, Block and 
Heineke 1975, Erlich 1973). Individuals with potentially better current and future opportunities 
in the legal labor market are less likely to commit crime. These opportunities in the labor market 
can be captured by the unemployment rate, which fluctuates over the business cycle. During a 
recession, when the unemployment rate goes up, employment chances in the labor market 
. 
                                                             
2 Greece, Luxembourg, Italy, Portugal, Estonia, Spain, Poland, United Kingdom, Germany, Ireland, Hungary, 
Belgium 
3 This list includes the same countries from the previous footnote except Estonia and Poland, but also includes 
Sweden, Austria and Netherlands 
4 For example, Nicolas Sarkozy who was initiator of "get tough on crime" policies in France when he was the 
Interior Minister in early 2000s, was elected president, thanks to his efforts on reducing crime.  2 
 
diminish.  As long as the employment prospects of individuals are influenced by the legal labor 
market, the changes in the unemployment rate will impact the crime rate which is an aggregation 
of individuals’ criminal activities.  During times of high unemployment, the relative benefit of 
working in the legal labor market for an individual decreases on the margin, increasing the crime 
rate in the country.  
This theoretical expectation has been confirmed by many empirical studies that generally 
make inference based on data from one country. For example, Corman and Mocan (2000), 
Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001), Gould, Weinberg and Mustard (2002) and Lin (2008) used 
data from the U.S. to investigate the impact of unemployment on crime. Other researchers have 
examined the same question using non-U.S. data, such as Edmark (2005) and Oster and Agell 
(2007) who made use of Swedish municipal-level panel data, and Buonanno (2006) who used 
Italian regional data.  
However, in an international context the impact of unemployment on crime has not been 
studied extensively. Only Wolpin (1980) analyzed unemployment’s impact on crime by using 
burglaries in Japan, U.K. and U.S
5
The primary reason for the paucity of research based on international data is the absence 
of comparable crime statistics across countries. Legal practices, such as definitions and recording 
methods of crimes differ across countries. Another reason for non-comparability is the fact that 
some crimes are underreported. Underreporting is a more serious issue for developing countries 
. Lin (2007) investigated the relationship between democracy 
and crime. Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza (2000, 2002) investigated the impact of income 
inequality on crime by analyzing only homicides and robberies. 
                                                             
5 He assumes that similar definitions are used for burglary in these countries. Furthermore, in his study U.S. is 
represented by California.   3 
 
and especially for low-value property crimes, such as theft and for crimes carrying a social 
stigma for the victim, such as rape (Soares 2004). Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza (2000, 
2002) dealt with this measurement problem by assuming a time-invariant form for the 
measurement error in crimes. In this paper a similar approach is used to deal with potential 
underreporting. In addition, differences in legal practices across countries are accounted for. The 
crime data employed in this paper have the advantage of having consistent measures of crime 
across countries as explained in more detail below. 
This paper identifies the impact of unemployment on crime by employing a uniformly 
collected international data set from European countries. In this international context, using the 
unemployment rate as an explanatory variable has an additional advantage. Analyses based on 
city level or state level data may suffer from reverse causality as crime may impact the local 
unemployment rate (Cullen and Levitt 1999). However, variation in a country’s crime rate is not 
expected to directly affect the unemployment rate of that specific country, minimizing the 
concern of a bias. Nevertheless, I also estimate instrumental variable models where the exchange 
rate of a country is used as an instrument for the unemployment rate of that country. 
The recent literature shows that the overall unemployment rate may not be an appropriate 
measure to identify the marginal criminal. Raphael and Winter – Ebmer (2001) and Lin (2008) 
argue that employment conditions among certain population groups may drive the impact of 
unemployment on crime. To investigate this possibility, I analyze the impact of gender and 
education specific unemployment on crime. The results show that changes in the number of 
unemployed males with low education influences the impact of the overall unemployment rate 
on crime. 4 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 explains the empirical 
framework and discusses the issues about identification; section 3 describes data used; section 4 
presents OLS estimates of overall unemployment rate; and section 5 analyzes the impact of 
population sub-groups’ unemployment on crime; section 6 discusses IV estimation  and finally 
section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Empirical Framework 
Following previous research, the estimated crime equation depicted by equation (1) 
below, includes controls for deterrence, economic incentives, consumption goods associated with 
crime and other socio-demographic controls (Raphael and Winter-Ebmer 2001 and Gould, 
Weinberg and Mustard 2002). 
(1) 
  
Crimei,t stands for crimes per hundred thousand people in country i, in year t. Six specific 
types of crimes are analyzed: homicide, assault, rape, robbery, theft and burglary. In some of the 
specifications, I use two categories of crime aggregates: monetary crimes and non-monetary 
crimes. Monetary crimes involve monetary returns for the offender, i.e. robbery, burglary and 
theft. Non-monetary crimes include homicide, rape and assault. The relationship between 
unemployment and crime is expected to be stronger for monetary crimes than for non-monetary 
crimes. However, as noted by Corman and Mocan (2000), there may be some impact of 
unemployment on non-monetary crimes
6
                                                             
6 This is because non-monetary crimes and monetary crimes can take place together in one incident. For example, a 
murder can follow a robbery. 
. 5 
 
Unemploymenti,t denotes the unemployment rate in country i, in year t. As explained in 
the introduction, in an individual level framework, participation in criminal activity is associated 
with own employment status of the individual. As long as the employment prospects of 
individuals are influenced by the legal labor market opportunities in the country, the changes in 
the unemployment rate will impact the crime rate which is an aggregation of individuals’ 
criminal activities. However, there may be mechanisms through which unemployment may 
impact crime other than through labor market opportunities. One of these channels is the 
consumption patterns of crime-related goods. For example, Ruhm (1995) has shown that alcohol 
consumption increases during expansions and decreases during recessions. Raphael and Winter-
Ebmer (2001) argue that gun availability and drug use may also move pro-cyclically. Another 
link between unemployment and crime may be driven by the availability of theft-worthy goods. 
Specifically, during a recession individuals’ incomes decline and this possibly reduces the 
consumption of high value-storing goods such as jewelry or consumer durables. The decrease in 
consumption of such wealth-storing goods may decrease the expected returns to criminal activity 
and therefore leads to reduction in crime rate. A third mechanism may work through income 
inequality. Mocan (1999) and the papers he cites find that increases in unemployment worsen the 
relative position of low-income groups. Kelly (2000) and Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza 
(2002) suggest that a higher degree of income inequality induces more criminal activity. They 
suggest that the mechanism-at-work is that in areas where income inequality is prevalent, poor 
individuals who have low returns from labor market are more likely to be living close to wealthy 
individuals who have theft-worthy goods. Therefore, for those poor individuals living in areas 
where there is greater degree of income inequality, the relative return to criminal activity is also 
greater. 6 
 
  The first two of the mechanisms mentioned above are directly controlled for in this 
analysis. Specifically, the impact of unemployment on crime is isolated from the impact of 
consumption of crime-related goods as two proxies for such consumption are included as control 
variables: alcohol consumption per capita and teenage pregnancy rate. The latter does not have a 
direct influence on crime, but rather an indirect one since teenage pregnancy is correlated with 
many negative social factors such as drug consumption (Verner and Cardoso 2008). In addition, I 
also control for the growth in GDP per capita. This may help isolate the impact of theft-worthy 
goods from the impact of the unemployment. A similar approach is taken by Witte (1980). 
Income inequality is not explicitly controlled for in my analysis because the sample size 
would have been reduced to almost half if a measure of inequality such as the Gini coefficient 
was added as a control variable. However, the inability to include an income inequality measure 
is not a significant problem for the sample I employ. Previous research documents that the source 
of the unemployment’s impact on income inequality is mainly due to the structural component of 
unemployment (Mocan 1999). A change in structural unemployment requires many years and 
some deep transformation in the economy. In this study, the number of years covered is limited 
to 1995-2003 (only 8 years). Therefore, for the countries in the sample, the structural component 
of unemployment should be rather stable in each country and its impact should be captured by 
the country fixed effects.  
In addition, as mentioned in the introduction, exogeneity of unemployment in a crime 
regression could be questionable. Specifically, employers may be reluctant to employ people 
with criminal records or they may move their businesses away from areas where the crime rate is 
high, leaving fewer employment chances in these areas (Cullen and Levitt 1999). Therefore, 
reverse causality from crime to the unemployment rate is possible. Previous literature provided 7 
 
mixed evidence on the exogeneity of unemployment in this context. For example, with a state 
panel data set, Gould, Weinberg and Mustard (2002) have shown that there is not much 
difference between OLS and IV estimates of unemployment in a crime equation, suggesting 
reverse causality is not a major issue with state level data. However, Lin (2008) and Raphael and 
Winter-Ember (2001) have found that IV estimates of the unemployment rate are consistently 
larger than the OLS estimates. 
In this paper, by using a panel of countries (more aggregated units of observation) I try to 
minimize the concern for reverse causality, because variations in the crime rate of a country in a 
given year are not expected to influence the unemployment rate of the country in that same year. 
I also estimate instrumental variable models in which the unemployment rate is instrumented by 
the exchange rate. Since the model is just identified, it is not possible to directly check the 
validity of the instrument. Therefore, I indirectly test the validity of the exchange rate by using a 
falsification test and a reverse causality test from crime to a very vulnerable economic activity, 
tourism, and consequently the exchange rate. As explained in detail in IV estimation section, 
both tests provide evidence for the validity of the instrument, the exchange rate. Furthermore, 
Lin (2008) and Oster and Agell (2007) also made use of the exchange rate to construct the 
instruments they employ for the state-level and municipality-level unemployment
7
The impact of the exchange rate on the unemployment rate is theoretically well-founded. 
Revenga (1992) argues that any change in import competition that leads to a shift in industry 
product demand will tend to shift employment in the same direction. This mechanism may be 
.  
                                                             
7 However, as their estimation was based on one country, to generate variation in their instruments within states or 
municipalities, the exchange rate was interacted with other state or municipality-specific characteristics. In this paper, such 
interaction is not necessary since the exchange rate varies for each country and the impact on a country’ unemployment 
rate of changes in foreign competition can be captured by the exchange rate of that country. 8 
 
linked through the impact of currency appreciation on profits (Sheets 1992; Clarida 1997), 
investment (Campa and Goldberg 1999) and/or production location (Goldberg 1993). When the 
exchange rate appreciates, goods and services in the country become more expensive compared 
to the rest of the world. This leads to a decrease in foreign demand for domestic goods and an 
increase in domestic demand for foreign goods. As a result, exports and eventually production in 
the domestic country declines which increases the unemployment rate. That is, if the exchange is 
calculated as the amount of domestic currency per U.S. dollar, then theoretically there should be 
an inverse relationship between the exchange rate and the unemployment rate. This IV method is 
designed to pick up the variation in employment statuses of individuals who can easily be laid-
off due to the change in foreign competition. 
Lin (2008) and Raphael and Winter-Ember (2001) suggested that unemployment of 
population sub-groups may be the driving force of the impact of overall unemployment rate on 
crime.  To gauge the potentially differential impact on crime of the unemployment rate 
prevailing in different population groups in a country, various unemployment rate measures are 
constructed. Specifically, in various specifications, I employ female unemployment rate, male 
unemployment rate, unemployment rate of the low-educated and the unemployment rate of the 
high-educated. I also use the ratio of the unemployed people in certain sub-groups of the 
population to the total labor force. For example, labor force share of unemployed females 
(males) is calculated by dividing the number of unemployed females (males) by the total labor 
force. Similarly, labor force share of the unemployed with low education (with high education) is 
the ratio of the number of unemployed with low education (with high education) to the total 
labor force. Notice that the sum of the labor force shares of the unemployed from population 
sub-groups equals to the overall unemployment rate. Therefore, employing the overall 9 
 
unemployment rate in the specification restricts the coefficients of the labor force share variables 
to be equal to each other. For example, the unrestricted form depicted by equation (2) below 
would reduce to equation (3) under the restriction that the coefficients βm and βf are equal to βu. 
Similarly, labor force shares of the unemployed with low and high education will be used in 
estimation. 
(2)       
(3)                             
Control variables include Policei,t-1, GDPGRi,t, Alcoholi,t, Urbanizationi,t, TeenPri,t, 
OldPerYoungi,t. Policei,t-1 is the total number of police officers per hundred thousand people. It is 
lagged by one year to avoid a potential reverse causality problem (Corman and Mocan, 2000; 
2005). GDPGRi,t stands for the GDP growth rate, Alcoholi,t is alcohol consumption per capita in 
liters. The socio-demographic controls include the urbanization rate (Urbanizationi,t), teen 
pregnancy rate (TeenPri,t) and ratio of old population to young population (OldPerYoungi,t). 
Urbanization rate is the share of population living in urban areas. Teen pregnancy rate measures 
the number of births to mothers aged 15 to 19 per 1,000 females. OldPerYoungi,t is calculated by 
dividing the number of people who are older than 39 to the number of people between 15 and 39. 
 
3. Data 
The crime and police officers data are obtained from the last two waves of European 
Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal Justice, covering the period between 1995 and 2003. The 
first wave of the European Sourcebook, which covers the period between 1990 and 1994, is not 
included in this analysis because police officers data are not available.  Prosecutions and 
convictions are available in all three waves and they can be considered as measures of 10 
 
deterrence.  However, they are not consistently measured between and within the countries over 
time, making the comparison difficult
8
The data set includes information from 22 countries
. 
9
Although the crime in European Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal Justice is 
consistently measured, there are some minor differences between the criminal justice practices of 
countries. For example, the standard definition of homicide is “intentionally killing of a person.” 
According to this definition, euthanasia should be included as homicide, since euthanasia 
involves killing a fetus intentionally. However, euthanasia is not considered a homicide by the 
 each of which contributes at least 3 
observations to the panel. Crime in these countries is measured by reported complaints to the 
police, similar to FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports. The crime and the police personnel statistics in 
the Sourcebook of European Crime and Criminal Justice data sets are consistently measured 
unlike those in other international crime data sets. For example, the United Nations Surveys of 
Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems provide data reported by law 
enforcement agencies in each country. The crime and police personnel statistics in the U.N. 
dataset are neither standard across countries nor are they verified by a third party, unlike the 
European Sourcebook data. 
                                                             
8 In most of the European countries the police use discretion to decide whether to prosecute or not. For example, the 
criminal can get away with a warning for small scale thefts or burglaries. Most importantly, the crime definitions 
used by the judicial system and the police are not identical. Although offence definitions adopted by the various 
police systems present uniformity among countries, rules for recording punishments can vary substantially. 
9 The number of countries in the European Sourcebook is greater than 22, but missing unemployment and police 
force data reduces the sample size. The included countries are: Austria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the U.K. 11 
 
legal system of some countries. Similarly, an attempt to kill a person should not be counted as a 
homicide, but there are conflicting practices about doing so in different countries. The European 
Sourcebook handles these minor differences by providing information about responses of legal 
system to such controversial actions for each country. Specifically, each country’s legal practices 
for certain types of actions, such as euthanasia and attempts to kill, are reported (whether they 
are counted as crime or not). Therefore, any non-conformity to definitions or data recording 
methods
10
The source of labor market variables and income, teen pregnancy and urban population 
controls is the World Development Indicators
 is controlled by a set of dummy variables. 
11. The ratio of old population to the young 
population is constructed using the data from the U.S. Census Bureau's International database
12.  
Alcohol consumption per capita variable is obtained from the World Health Organization’s 
Global Alcohol Database
13
The baseline model, depicted by equation (1) is estimated by OLS. The results are 
provided in panels 1 and 2 of Table 2 for non-monetary crimes (homicide, rape, assault and the 
. Table 1 presents the definitions and the descriptive statistics of all 
the variables as well as their sources. 
 
4. OLS Results 
                                                             
10 There are differences in timing and unit of collection, whether the principal offence rule is applied and the ways 
of dealing with multiple offences and crimes committed by more than one offender between the countries. Some of 
the countries record crimes as soon as they are reported to the police and others record subsequently or after 
investigation. Some countries count offences whereas others only count offenders. 
11 http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/DDPQQ/member.do?method=getMembers&userid=1&queryId=135 
12 http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb/ 
13 http://www.who.int/globalatlas/default.asp 12 
 
total non-monetary crimes) and monetary crimes (robbery, burglary, theft and total monetary 
crimes), respectively. The regressions include country fixed effects and year dummies. Robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
This analysis of the monetary and non-monetary crime rates allows for a test of the 
theoretical expectation that a change in the unemployment rate is more strongly associated with 
crimes that involve monetary benefits. Being unemployed can induce motivation to earn income 
illegally, but it does not necessarily increase violent behavior. The estimates in Table 2 support 
this expectation. The sign of the unemployment rate’s coefficients are positive and significantly 
different from zero for all monetary crimes. This positive and significant impact of 
unemployment on monetary crimes continues to hold when TeenPri,t and Alcoholi,t  are excluded 
individually and jointly from the crime regression. However, the unemployment rate does not a 
significantly impact non-monetary crimes. 
  In order to check whether the estimated impacts are same across countries, I estimate the 
equation 1 with quantile regressions. For all monetary crimes, the marginal effect of the 
unemployment rate at each percentile falls within the OLS confidence intervals. An illustration 
of this overlap is provided in Figure 1 for the total monetary crimes. Furthermore, the marginal 
effect of the unemployment rate on total monetary crimes for 25
th, 50
th and 75
th percentiles are 
not different from each other at conventional significance levels. Similar results are obtained for 
robberies, burglaries and thefts. Therefore, it is safe to state that the impact of the unemployment 





5. Impacts of Population Sub-Groups’ Unemployment on Crime 
As discussed in the introduction and empirical framework sections and by Gould, 
Weinberg and Mustard (2002), Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001) and Lin (2008), overall 
unemployment rate may not be able to identify the marginal criminal. The coefficient of the 
unemployment rate captures the average effect of the overall unemployment rate among 
individuals. However, this impact of the unemployment rate may differ between population sub 
groups. In other words, individuals who belong to two different population sub-groups (such as 
highly educated individuals versus poorly-educated ones or males versus females) and who are 
financially at the margin of committing a crime may respond differently when they become 
unemployed. For example, Freeman (1995), Grogger (1998), and LaGrange, Teresa C. and 
Robert A. Silverman (1999) argued that males are more likely to commit a crime than females 
do. Similarly, Becker and Mulligan (1997), Lochner (2004), and Lochner and Moretti (2004) 
have suggested that higher educational attainment decreases criminal activity. Furthermore, 
Grogger (1998) and Gould, Weinberg and Mustard (2002) has reported that unskilled and 
uneducated males respond to changes in their employment statuses most significantly. To 
investigate the possibility that some population sub-group’s unemployment drives the impact of 
the overall unemployment rate on crime, I will employ education and gender-specific 
unemployment measures in crime equations as control variables in the next sub-sections. 
 
5.1. The Effect of Gender-specific Unemployment on Crime 
I investigate whether the effect of male unemployment on crime is different from that of 
female unemployment by using the two measures of unemployment as described in the empirical 
framework section: the labor force share decomposition of the overall unemployment rate and 14 
 
the gender-specific unemployment rates. The results are summarized in Table 3 where only the 
coefficients of monetary crimes
14
Similar to previous sub-section, education-specific unemployment measures are 
employed in equation (1) to gauge their differential impacts. Specifically, the unemployment 
rates of low and high educated people (results are presented in Panel 1 of Table 4) and the shares 
 are reported although all control variables are included in the 
regressions. The signs and significance of the control variables are similar to those in the model 
with the overall unemployment rate (Table 2). 
The results from the analysis using the female and male unemployment rates as the 
explanatory variables are presented in panel 1 of Table 3. In all cases except theft, male 
unemployment rate is a more significant determinant of monetary crimes than the female 
unemployment rate.  Female unemployment rate becomes insignificant when it is included 
jointly with male unemployment rate. However, male unemployment rate continues to be 
positive and significant, or it is at least greater than its standard deviation. The estimates from the 
model that uses the labor force shares of unemployed males and females are shown in panel 2 of 
Table 3.  The results of the models that employ labor force shares of the unemployed males and 
females are very similar to the results presented in panel 1. Both of the models suggest that male 
unemployment is more influential in driving unemployment’s impact on aggregate monetary 
crimes, robberies and burglaries. However, the dominant impact of male unemployment is not 
observed in case of theft. 
 
5.2. The Effect of Education-specific Unemployment on Crime 
                                                             
14 For non-monetary crimes, the coefficients of gender-specific unemployment measures are statistically 
insignificant. 15 
 
of the unemployed people with high and low education in the labor force (in Panel 2 of Table 4) 
are included in equation (1) instead of the overall unemployment rate. Both analyses yield the 
same conclusion that the unemployment of low-educated people has a greater influence in 
robberies than does the unemployment of the high-educated. For total monetary crime rate, the 
impact of unemployment of high educated people is highly insignificant, whereas the 
unemployment of the low educated have p-values around 0.20. On the other hand, the models 
produce conflicting results for thefts and burglaries. Although significant and positive when 
included individually, unemployment of low and high educated people becomes highly 
insignificant when both are included jointly. The results of this analysis indicate the unemployed 
with low education are associated with more robberies but neither of the education-specific 
unemployment particularly drives thefts or burglaries. 
 
5.3. The Effect of Gender-and-Education-Specific Unemployment on Monetary Crimes 
Education and gender-specific unemployment rates are not available in the data source 
and these variables cannot be calculated using the available information. Therefore, I only use 
the labor force share variables in regressions. Equation (1) is modified to include labor force 
shares of the unemployed males and females with low and high education instead of the overall 
unemployment rate, i.e. there are four unemployment variables in this specification. 
The results are displayed in Table 5. On all monetary crime types, the effects of the labor 
force share of the unemployed males with low education are positive and significant. The labor 
force shares of both unemployed males and females with high education do not significantly 
impact any monetary crime. The basic finding here is that the relationship between monetary 16 
 
crimes and unemployment is mostly influenced by the unemployment of males with low 
education.  
For each percentage point increase in the labor force share of the unemployed males with 
low education, total monetary crime, robbery, theft and burglary rates increase by 6.5%, 39%, 
6.7% and 7.8%, respectively. On average about 20% of the unemployed people are males with 
low education. For one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate, the labor force share 
of the unemployed males with low education increases by 0.2 percentage points. Therefore, 65% 
of the impact of the overall unemployment rate on total monetary crime rate is due to the 
unemployment of low educated males. Shares of the overall unemployment rate’s impact that is 
driven by the unemployment of the low educated males are 94%, 67% and 61% for robbery, 
burglary and theft rates. 
 
6. 2SLS Results 
  As discussed in the empirical framework section, unemployment can be endogenous in a 
crime regression. Although using a country-level panel data set minimizes this concern, I 
nevertheless estimate IV models where the unemployment rate is instrumented by the exchange 
rate. The exchange rate impacts unemployment rate through its effect on foreign competition. 
For example, if the exchange rate is calculated as the amount of domestic currency per foreign 
currency, then a decrease in the exchange rate will result in a decrease in purchasing power of 
the foreign currency. Everything else held constant, this will lead to a fall in foreign demand and 
consequently the unemployment rate will rise. 17 
 
  The exchange rate data are obtained from Penn World Tables
15 where the exchange rate 
is calculated as domestic currency units per U.S. dollar. However, some of the countries 
analyzed in this study changed their national currency when they joined the currency union of 
the European Union. Among the countries considered, Austria, Finland, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxemburg, the Netherlands and Portugal have been parts of the European Monetary Union 
starting with 1999 with Greece joining them in 2001
16
Similar to the OLS results, the estimates of unemployment rate from the second stage of 
2SLS are positive and significant in all cases. For all crime types 2SLS estimates are greater than 
OLS results
. In the analysis for these countries, after 
they joined the European Monetary Union, the Euro-U.S. Dollar exchange rate is used.  
The 2SLS estimates of the unemployment rate’s impact on monetary crimes are presented 
in Table 6. Rows A and B show the point estimate of the unemployment rate in the second stage 
of 2SLS estimation and its standard error, respectively. Row C presents the coefficient of the 
exchange rate in the first stage. Row D gives the t statistic of the exchange rate’s coefficient in 
the first stage. Row C in Table 6 indicates an inverse relationship between the unemployment 
rate and the exchange rate. The coefficients of the exchange rate are always negative and highly 
significant. The t-statistics are close to 5 satisfying the rule of thumb for a strong instrument. 
17




 Slovenia and Cyprus became members in 2007 and 2008, but these years are not covered in this study. 
. Specifically, when significant, the estimate for elasticity of each crime with 
17 Because the 2SLS estimates of the unemployment rate provides the impact of the overall unemployment rate that 
is caused by the movements in the exchange rate; it is not surprising to see that the 2SLS estimates of the overall 
unemployment rate are greater than those of the OLS estimates. If an exchange rate shock primarily increases the 
unemployment of low educated males to as argued by Bertrand (2004), then the increase in the overall 
unemployment rate that is captured by the 2SLS estimator is mostly due to increase in the number of unemployed 18 
 
respect to a specific unemployment measure is twice as large as OLS elasticities. Similar 
findings have been reported by Lin (2008) and Raphael and Winter-Ember (2001), who suggest 
that 2SLS estimates of semi elasticity of monetary crimes with respect to unemployment is about 
5% when OLS estimates of semi-elasticities are about 2%.
18
The validity of the exchange rate cannot be tested directly in this analysis as the model is 
just-identified. However, Angrist and Krueger (1999) proposed an indirect method of testing the 
validity of an instrument in a just-identified model
 
The implications of the instrumental variable estimation are consistent with those 
obtained from OLS. Bertrand (2004) suggests that the employment statuses of males with low 
education are more vulnerable to changes in foreign competition. In other words, males with low 
education are more likely to get laid-off in response to an exchange rate shock. Moreover, 
according to the findings from the OLS estimation, the variation in the unemployment of males 
with low education generates the biggest impact on property crimes. Therefore, both estimation 
methods predict that the marginal criminal is among males with low education. 
19
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
males with low education.  As suggested by the OLS estimates, the unemployment of this group have a greater 
impact on crime more than the unemployment of other groups do. Therefore, the increase in the overall 
unemployment rate due to a movement in the exchange rate will impact property crimes more than an increase of 
same magnitude in the overall unemployment rate (which includes all gender-and-education specific groups). 
18 When labor force share of the unemployed males with low education is used instead of the overall unemployment 
rate, similar results are obtained. The elasticity of the monetary crimes with respect to this labor force share variable 
is larger than its OLS estimate and in the first stage the exchange rate is highly significant. In these IV and OLS 
regressions, among the labor force share variables only the labor force share of unemployed males with low 
education is included together with all the control variables. 
19 An application of this method can be found in Oster and Agell (2007). 
. The method involves an investigation of 19 
 
whether the instrument has an impact on the dependent variable in specifications where the 
impact should be non-existent. In this spirit, I regressed twice and three-times lagged crime rates 
on the contemporaneous exchange rate and other dependent variables except for the 
unemployment rate in reduced form regressions. The absolute values of the obtained t-statistics 
of the exchange rate are all less than 2, suggesting that the monetary crime rates indeed are not 
influenced by the future values of the exchange rate.  
  One possibility that may invalidate the instrumental variable is that the dependent 
variable influences the instrument, i.e. crime impacting the exchange rate. This may happen if 
crime impacts economic activity and this effect gets filtered out through a change in the 
exchange rate. In order to investigate if crime has an influence on economic activity, I analyzed 
tourism industry which is one of the most crime-vulnerable economic activities. I regressed the 
international incoming tourists per capita and international tourism revenue per capita on crimes 
considered in this analysis and control variables
20. The crime rate is lagged by one year to avoid 
potential reverse causation from tourism activity to crime. The results
21
                                                             
20 The control variables in these regressions include the unemployment rate, GDP growth rate, urbanization rate, 
teenage pregnancy rate, ratio of old-to-young people, exchange rate, tuberculosis rate and number of hospital beds 
per 1,000 people as well as country fixed effects and year dummies. 
21 Results from this regression are not reported. But they are available upon request. 
 showed that non-
monetary crimes (homicide, rape and assault) impact tourism activity significantly, whereas 
monetary crimes (theft, robbery and burglary), on which this paper is focused, do not. Therefore, 
an impact from monetary crimes to the exchange rate through tourism is not plausible since 
monetary crimes do not influence tourism. 20 
 
  As an extension to the IV estimation described above, I used the interaction of a 
country’s exchange rate and ratio of its total trade to the GDP as the instrument of the 
unemployment rate.
22
Because the overall unemployment rate may not be able to identify people on the margin 
of committing a crime, even after controlling for endogeneity (Lin 2008 and Raphael Winter-
Ebmer 2001), the impacts of gender-specific and education-specific unemployment on crime are 
 If a country has a larger trade sector, then more jobs in this country should 
depend on foreign competition, and consequently the impact of the exchange rate on the 
unemployment rate should be greater in magnitude. The coefficient of the interaction term in the 
first stage is negative and significant at 1%, implying that the impact of the unemployment rate 
on monetary crimes is larger when the trade share of the country is greater. 
 
7. Summary and Conclusion 
This paper investigates the impact of unemployment on crime using a panel data set of 22 
European countries, and it is one of the few papers which studies crime in an international 
context. The primary advantage of the data set is that it contains consistently measured crime and 
police force variables across countries and over time.  
In addition to OLS estimation, 2SLS is employed to eliminate the potential endogeneity 
of unemployment in the crime regressions, instrumenting the unemployment rate with the 
exchange rate. In line with Raphael and Winter–Ebmer (2001) and Lin (2008), the comparison of 
2SLS and OLS results shows that the unemployment rate is endogeneous even in an international 
context as 2SLS produces greater coefficients than OLS does. Specifically, 2SLS estimates are 
twice as large as OLS estimates. 
                                                             
22 See footnote 17. 21 
 
investigated using the unemployment rate and labor force share of these groups. The results 
show that the unemployment of males with low education is more influential in driving the 
impact of the overall unemployment rate on crime. About 65% of the impact of the overall 
unemployment rate on crime can be attributable to the unemployment of low educated males. 
This finding is consistent with the results of the IV estimation. Since the low-educated 
males’ employment statuses are most likely to be affected by the foreign competition (Bertrand 
2004), the variation in the overall unemployment rate due to the exchange rate movements is 
more likely to impact this group. Both analyses point out that the marginal criminal is among the 
unemployed males with low education. 
 The magnitude of the unemployment’s impact on crime is economically significant. For 
example, U.K. and Italy suffer about 45,000 and 80,000 additional monetary crimes per year for 
one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate according to OLS and 2SLS estimates, 
respectively. If the social cost per monetary crime is roughly $45,000
23
                                                             
23
 I used Anderson (1999)’s estimates for US. According to his calculations, lost production due to crimes and the opportunity 
costs of crime total $527 billion, implying about 45,000$ cost per monetary crime in 1999 dollars. I assume, due to violent and 
property crimes people incur the same level of production loss and opportunity cost. 
 in 1999 dollars, then 
Italians and Britons incur an extra cost of about $2-$4 billion due to the impact of one percentage 
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Definitions and Descriptive Statistics 
Variable  Definition  Source  Observation  Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Non-Monetary Crimes  Total Homicides, assaults and rapes per 
100,000 people 
A  168  163.48  219.34 
Monetary Crimes  Total thefts, burglaries and robberies per 
100,000 people 
A  184  3790.47  2726.96 
Homicide Rate  Homicides per 100,000 people  A  169  4.58  3.75 
Assault Rate  Assaults per 100,000 people  A  189  190.22  236.60 
Rape Rate  Rapes per 100,000 people  A  190  7.75  5.77 
Robbery Rate  Robberies per 100,000 people  A  189  67.63  65.64 
Theft Rate  Thefts per 100,000 people  A  189  2752.49  2050.24 
Burglary Rate  Burglaries per 100,000 people  A  184  961.67  737.61 
Police Rate  Total number of police officers per 
100,000 people 
A  190  319.70  117.84 
GDP Growth Rate  Growth rate of GDP, in percentages  B  190  3.13  2.57 
Alcohol  Alcohol Consumption per capita, in liters  C  212  9.95  2.76 
Urbanization Rate  Ratio of the population living in urban 
areas to the total population, in percentages 
B  190  66.84  11.80 
Teen Pregnancy Rate  Births to mothers aged 15-19 per 1000 
females 
B  210  127.34  89.70 
Old/Young  Ratio of population aged more than 40 to 
population aged 15-39, in percentages 
D  210  120.18  12.96 
Unemployment Rate  Ratio of unemployed population to labor 
force 
B  221  8.57  5.06 
Male unemployment rate  Ratio of unemployed male population to 
male labor force, in percentages 
B  221  8.14  5.05 
Female unemployment rate  Ratio of unemployed female population to 
female labor force, in percentages 
B  221  9.21  5.49 
           28 
 
Table 1 Continued 
Variable  Definition  Source  Observation  Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Share of Unemployed Males in Labor 
Force 
Ratio of unemployed male population to 
total labor force, in percentages 
B  221  4.63  2.94 
Share of Unemployed Females in 
Labor Force 
Ratio of unemployed female population 
total labor force, in percentages 
B  221  3.93  2.27 
Unemployment among the poorly-
educated 
Ratio of unemployed population with at 
most primary schooling to total labor force 
with at most primary schooling, in 
percentages 
B  190  11.67  7.20 
Unemployment among the well-
educated 
Ratio of unemployed population with more 
than primary schooling to total labor force 
with more than primary schooling, in 
percentages 
B  189  7.41  3.82 
Labor Force Share of the Poorly-
educated and the Unemployed 
Ratio of unemployed population with at 
most primary schooling to total labor force, 
in percentages 
B  206  2.94  1.59 
Labor Force Share of the Well-
educated and the Unemployed 
Ratio of unemployed population with more 
than primary schooling to total labor force, 
in percentages 
B  206  5.22  3.21 
Labor Force Share of Poorly-educated 
and Unemployed Males 
Ratio of unemployed male population with 
at most primary schooling to total labor 
force, in percentages 
B  206  1.61  1.04 
Labor Force Share of  Well-educated 
and Unemployed Males 
Ratio of unemployed male population with 
more than primary schooling to total labor 
force, in percentages 
B  206  2.68  1.69 
Labor Force Share of Poorly-educated 
and Unemployed Females 
Ratio of unemployed female population 
with at most primary schooling to total 
labor force, in percentages 
B  206  1.13  0.67 
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Table 1 Concluded 
Variable  Definition  Source  Observation  Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Labor Force Share of  Well-educated 
and Unemployed Females 
Ratio of unemployed female population 
with more than primary schooling to total 
labor force, in percentages 
B  206  2.53  1.59 
Exchange Rate  Amount of domestic currency that one U.S. 
dollar can buy 
F  232  25943  168275 
A – European Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal Justice. 
B – World Development Indicators. 
C – World Health Organization, Global Alcohol Database. 
D – U.S. Census Bureau, International Database. 
E – United Nations, Common Database. 
F – Penn World Tables30 
 
Table 2 
The Effect of Total Unemployment Rate on Specific Crimes 
Panel 1: Non-Monetary Crimes 
Variable  Non-monetary Crimes
a  Homicide  Assault  Rape 
Unemployment Rate  -3.223  -0.091  -1.713  0.510** 
  (4.796)  (0.068)  (4.158)  (0.224) 
Policet-1  0.751**  0.017***  0.618*  0.011 
  (0.367)  (0.004)  (0.312)  (0.009) 
Urban  15.837*  -0.422*  17.073**  0.371 
  (8.477)  (0.234)  (7.071)  (0.228) 
GDP Growth  5.822*  -0.095*  4.156  0.321*** 
  (3.056)  (0.051)  (2.682)  (0.098) 
Old/Young  20.790*  -0.014  -4.681  0.326*** 
  (11.257)  (0.051)  (2.899)  (0.112) 
Alcohol  -3.933  0.066  17.187  0.285 
  (3.182)  (0.097)  (10.649)  (0.244) 
Teen Pregnancy Rate  1.346*  0.016*  1.254*  0.023 
  (0.684)  (0.008)  (0.654)  (0.020) 
N  125  126  136  137 
 
Panel 2: Monetary Crimes 
Variable  Monetary Crimes
a  Robbery  Theft  Burglary 
Unemployment Rate  74.712**  5.986*  55.023**  22.779** 
  (30.689)  (3.147)  (21.602)  (9.623) 
Policet-1  -6.478***  -0.136  -2.283*  -2.242*** 
  (2.000)  (0.171)  (1.280)  (0.662) 
Urban  26.932  3.981  28.921  6.101 
  (45.474)  (4.874)  (27.733)  (16.694) 
GDP Growth  -3.682  -0.186  1.892  -2.691 
  (15.379)  (2.011)  (10.210)  (4.991) 
Young/Old  -70.183*  1.412  -0.999  -5.071 
  (38.805)  (1.810)  (10.550)  (4.387) 
Alcohol  -8.674  -1.686  -29.244  -23.228 
  (15.251)  (3.583)  (27.529)  (14.175) 
Teen Pregnancy Rate  -0.848  -0.07  -0.452  -0.506 
  (3.499)  (0.451)  (2.452)  (1.049) 
N  131  136  136  131 
Each column is output from one regression. Dependent variables are listed on top of each column. All models 
include data collection and time dummies and country indicators. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** 
and *** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
a Monetary crime rate includes robbery, theft and burglary rates. Non-Monetary crime rate includes homicide, rape 
and assault rate. See Table 1 for definitions of other variables. 31 
 
Table 3 
The Impact of Gender-Specific Unemployment on Monetary Crimes 
Panel 1: Unemployment Rates 
  Monetary Crimes
a  Robbery  Theft  Burglary 
  (I)  (II)  (III)  (I)  (II)  (III)  (I)  (II)  (III)  (I)  (II)  (III) 
Male  75.48**     97.58  6.46**     11.70*  50.19**     21.11  25.10**     45.64* 
(30.74)     (65.96)  (3.14)     (5.90)  (21.00)     (40.86)  (10.08)     (23.60) 
Female     58.07**  -26.40     3.67  -6.24     52.50**  34.61     14.97*  -24.54 
   (29.05)  (63.48)     (2.62)  (4.75)     (20.76)  (40.97)     (8.94)  (22.43) 
 
                       
 
                       
Panel 2: Labor Force Shares of the Unemployed 
  Monetary Crimes
a  Robbery  Theft  Burglary 
  (I)  (II)  (III)  (I)  (II)  (III)  (I)  (II)  (III)  (I)  (II)  (III) 
Males  130.45**     146.97  11.46**     21.02**  89.57**     55.38  42.56**     63.25 
  (53.22)     (108.97)  (5.52)     (9.71)  (36.70)     (68.88)  (17.28)     (39.26) 
Females     139.28**  -25.51     8.94  -14.71     114.93**  52.62     38.99*  -31.92 
     (66.42)  (136.71)     (6.04)  (9.29)     (47.81)  (90.28)     (20.50)  (48.84) 
Panel 1 presents results with the independent variables male and female unemployment rate. Panel 2 shows the results of the model where labor force share of the 
unemployed males and females are used as independent variables. For each dependent variable there are three sets of results. Columns (I) and (II) show estimates 
from the models where female unemployment and male unemployment is excluded respectively. Third column present the results when both are included jointly. 
Only the estimates for the variables of interest are reported. Each model includes lagged police rate, GDP growth rate, urbanization rate, alcohol, teen pregnancy 
rate, old/young as well as data collection and country indicators and time dummies. The unreported estimates are available upon request. Robust standard errors 
are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
a Monetary crime rate includes robbery, theft and burglary rates. See Table 1 for definitions of other variables. 
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Table 4 
The Impact of Education-Specific Unemployment on Monetary Crimes 
Panel 1: The Unemployment Rate 
  Monetary Crimes
a  Robbery  Theft  Burglary 
  (I)  (II)  (III)  (I)  (II)  (III)  (I)  (II)  (III)  (I)  (II)  (III) 
Low 
educated
b  57.03**    38.18  5.916**    8.83**  37.98**    13.96  16.30**    10.15 
(22.10)    (24.51)  (2.61)    (3.50)  (15.08)    (17.73)  (7.05)    (7.99) 
High 
Educated
b    98.85**  46.96    4.98  -7.11*    77.79**  58.68    29.12*  15.32 
  (47.26)  (54.95)    (3.55)  (3.61)    (31.75)  (38.95)    (15.27)  (18.34) 
 
                       
 
                       
Panel 2: Labor Force Share of the Unemployed 
  Monetary Crimes
a  Robbery  Theft  Burglary 
  (I)  (II)  (III)  (I)  (II)  (III)  (I)  (II)  (III)  (I)  (II)  (III) 
Low 
Educated
b  148.85**    105.70  18.95**    20.79**  119.40**    101.10  38.15*    18.22 
(74.54)    (86.16)  (7.66)    (8.74)  (57.08)    (65.60)  (20.30)    (23.81) 
High 
Educated
b    85.89*  47.68    5.59  -2.07    57.69*  20.47    28.62*  22.03 
  (47.22)  (51.88)    (4.17)  (4.23)    (32.10)  (33.71)    (16.17)  (18.89) 
Panel 1 presents results with the independent variables unemployment rates of low and high educated people. Panel 2 shows the results of the model where labor 
force share of the unemployed with low and high education are used as independent variables. For each dependent variable there are three sets of results. 
Columns (I) and (II) show estimates from the models where unemployment of the high educated and unemployment of the low educated are excluded 
respectively. Third column present the results when both are included jointly. Only the estimates for the variables of interest are reported. Each model includes 
lagged police rate, GDP growth rate, urbanization rate, alcohol, teen pregnancy rate, old/young as well as data collection and country indicators and time 
dummies. The unreported estimates are available upon request. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. 
a Monetary crime rate includes robbery, theft and burglary rates. See Table 1 for definitions of other variables. 
b High educated people are those who completed schooling beyond primary school. 
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Table 5 
The Impact of Gender and Education-Specific Unemployment on Monetary Crimes 
Labor Force Share of the Unemployed 
 
Monetary Crimes
a  Robbery  Theft  Burglary 
 
(I)  (II)  (III)  (I)  (II)  (III)  (I)  (II)  (III)  (I)  (II)  (III) 
Males with Low 
Education
b 
317.26**    247.84**  23.84*    26.42*  224.07**    185.29*  103.46***    75.16** 




-190.24    -200.97  11.31    11.60  -120.05    -127.96  -79.93*    -84.24* 
(133.66)    (133.06)  (11.65)    (11.16)  (96.24)    (97.82)  (47.32)    (45.97) 
Males with High 
Education
b    199.05  164.67    18.58  10.27    98.95  73.18    82.96  75.81 
  (164.41)  (170.02)    (13.04)  (12.62)    (104.27)  (108.63)    (61.12)  (62.56) 
Females with 
High Education
b    -49.4  -73.95    -10.31  -17.02    7.39  -16.93    -36.01  -40.69` 
  (161.05)  (163.90)    (12.53)  (12.48)    (108.25)  (109.19)    (58.27)  (59.31) 
The table shows the results of the model where labor force share of the unemployed males and females with low and high education are used as independent 
variables. For each dependent variable there are three sets of results. In column (I), labor force shares of males and females with high education are excluded. 
Column (II) shows estimates from the model where labor force shares of the unemployed males and females with low education are excluded. Third column 
present the results when all variables listed are included jointly. Only the estimates for the variables of interest are reported. Each model includes lagged police 
rate, GDP growth rate, urbanization rate, alcohol, teen pregnancy rate, old/young as well as data collection and country indicators and time dummies. The 
unreported estimates are available upon request. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
a Monetary crime rate includes robbery, theft and burglary rates. See Table 1 for definitions of other variables. 
b High educated people are those who completed schooling beyond primary school. 34 
 
Table 6 
The Impact of Unemployment on Monetary Crimes, 2SLS Results 
    Monetary 
Crimes 
Robbery  Theft  Burglary 
A  Coefficient of the Unemployment Rate 
in the 2
nd stage 
152.179***  12.783*  116.009***  39.882** 
B  Standard error of the Unemployment 
Rate 
(53.291)  (7.818)  (39.222)  (16.544) 
C  Coefficient of the exchange rate in the 
1
st stage 
-0.0000198  -0.0000196  -0.0000196  -0.0000198 
D  t-statistic of the exchange rate  [-4.66]  [-4.93]  [-4.93]  [-4.66] 
Only the estimates for monetary crimes are reported. The unemployment rate is instrumented with the exchange rate. Each regression includes all control 
variables as well as data collection and country indicators and time dummies. *, ** and *** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Monetary 
crime rate includes robbery, theft and burglary rates. See Table 1 for definitions of other variables. 
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Figure 1 
Impact of the Unemployment Rate on Monetary Crimes over the Distribution of Monetary Crimes 
 
 
The solid line depicts the impact of the unemployment rate on total monetary crime rate over distribution of total monetary crime rate from a 
quantile regression which is depicted by the equation (1). The dashed line shows the OLS confidence intervals. 